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ABSTRACT
For the past 20 years, researchers have investigated the use
of eye tracking in security applications. We present a holistic
view on gaze-based security applications. In particular, we can-
vassed the literature and classify the utility of gaze in security
applications into a) authentication, b) privacy protection, and
c) gaze monitoring during security critical tasks. This allows
us to chart several research directions, most importantly 1)
conducting field studies of implicit and explicit gaze-based
authentication due to recent advances in eye tracking, 2) re-
search on gaze-based privacy protection and gaze monitoring
in security critical tasks which are under-investigated yet very
promising areas, and 3) understanding the privacy implica-
tions of pervasive eye tracking. We discuss the most promising
opportunities and most pressing challenges of eye tracking
for security that will shape research in gaze-based security
applications for the next decade.
Author Keywords
Eye tracking; Gaze Interaction; Security; Privacy; Survey
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of
security and privacy; •Human-centered computing→Hu-
man computer interaction (HCI);
INTRODUCTION
The security community is an early adopter of eye tracking.
Security researchers have explored the use of eye tracking
for biometric authentication [14, 67, 107, 108] and password
entry [53, 93] since the early 2000s. Twenty years later, eye
tracking algorithms and technologies have matured signifi-
cantly. Recent advances in visual computing, gaze estimation
algorithms, cameras, and processing power of computing de-
vices have led to eye tracking being no longer constrained to
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Figure 1. Security researchers are among the first to adopt eye tracking
for gaze-based security applications. We classified work from related
publications based on the utility of gaze: a) authentication, b) privacy
protection, and c) improving security by understanding users through
their gaze behavior. The figure highlights that there has been an increase
in contributions in this area largely due to the maturity and accessibil-
ity of the eye tracking hardware and software. It is also clear that some
areas received less attention than others albeit being equally promising.
desktop computers but being also available on head-mounted
displays [6,45,49,52,103], handheld mobile devices [73], and
public displays [171]. Today, laptops such as Alienware 17
R4 and Acer Predator 21 X come with integrated eye trackers,
and smartphones such as the iPhone X and Huawei Mate 30
Pro are equipped with front-facing depth cameras, capable of
accurate gaze estimation. Eye trackers are also now used in
driver monitoring systems in BMW [17] and Volvo cars [166].
These are important developments for security applications.
The ubiquity of eye tracking means that researchers can finally
take their gaze-based security applications to the real world.
The benefits of large-scale eye tracking include: 1) higher
adoption of gaze-based security applications (e.g., gaze-based
privacy protection or gaze-based authentication), which in turn
leads to better understanding their effectiveness and perfor-
mance in daily scenarios, 2) allowing more gaze data to be
collected that can be used to improve existing approaches (e.g.,
to improve the accuracy of biometric authentication), and 3)
the ability to unobtrusively understand users through their gaze
behaviour during security critical tasks (e.g., understanding
gaze behavior when subject to phishing attacks).
Despite the significant potential this creates from both a se-
curity and a user experience perspective, a holistic view of
how research on gaze-based security applications developed
in the past decades is missing. This paper closes this gap by a)
surveying and organizing knowledge in this field based on pre-
vious work in the area, b) clustering existing work into three
main application areas: gaze-based authentication, gaze-based
privacy protection, and gaze monitoring during security tasks,
and c) highlighting the most promising opportunities and most
pressing challenges that require further research.
We present 8 important and promising directions for future
research in this area and identify 2 challenges that need to be
addressed as they hinder the adoption of gaze-based security
applications. For example, we highlight that the recent devel-
opments in the area make it possible to conduct field studies
for gaze-based security applications. This was until recently
infeasible due to limitations in mobile eye tracking hardware.
We discuss other research opportunities, such as blending
implicit gaze-based authentication with everyday tasks and
privacy protection by estimating users’ and bystanders’ gaze.
We also underline challenges that are important to address in
upcoming HCI research, such as understanding the privacy im-
plications of pervasive eye tracking and the trade off between
the accuracy and speed of gaze-based security applications.
RELATED WORK
There have been attempts to organize the existing research in
eye tracking for security applications. Most of those focused
on the use of physiological biometrics (e.g., iris [24, 111, 117],
retina [24, 111, 117], periocular [117]) for building and evalu-
ating authentication schemes, without considering the use of
gaze-based features. Many works apply gaze-based features
to build an authentication scheme, aiming to overcome the
limitations that are introduced by the use of physiological
biometrics, such as inability to revoke passwords once com-
promised, or unintentional authentications [146]. Most surveys
considering eye gaze do not address the HCI perspective but
focus on technical [174] and methodological [47] aspects of
such systems (e.g., the use of bio-signals for human identifica-
tion [41]). None of the existing surveys consider multi-factor
gaze-based authentication, gaze-based privacy protection, or
the use of gaze to understand users during security tasks. To
our knowledge, this is the first survey to holistically cover the
three major utilities of gaze in security applications.
In short, we focus on the use of eye gaze in security and privacy
applications from an HCI perspective. We do not consider
work on the use of physiological-only biometrics nor work
that is solely based on the technical aspects of gaze-based
security and privacy applications. Our contribution is twofold:
(1) we survey research manuscripts and classify previous work
based on the utility of gaze in security applications; (2) we
highlight promising HCI research directions and challenges
that hinder the uptake of gaze-based security applications.
METHODOLOGY
A number of surveys served as a starting point for our re-
view [41, 47, 111, 117, 138, 145, 174]. Additionally, we used
the following search terms and all their combinations to ob-
tain the papers that formed the basis of our literature review:
(“eye tracking” OR “Gaze”) AND (“security” OR “privacy”
OR “authentication” OR “password” OR “biometric”). We
considered papers published in HCI, UbiComp, Eye Track-
ing, and Security conferences or journals: CHI, IJHCS, HCI,
UbiComp/IMWUT, MobileHCI, IJHCI, ETRA, CVPR, CCS,
SOUPS, USENIX Security, S&P, and NDSS. We started with
this initial set and then additionally conducted backward and
forward reference searching in the papers we collected.
We examined the set and excluded papers that were not written
in English, not related to our research objective (e.g., systems
that are solely based on physiological data), papers that re-
ported the same studies (e.g., a research team published their
work in a journal but subsequent articles were published in
workshops) and non peer-reviewed works (e.g., master theses
and technical reports).
We coded each paper of the final set based on the utility of
gaze in security applications, and, finally, we identified three
main categories: 1) Authentication: gaze was used for explicit,
implicit, and multi-factor authentication; 2) Privacy protection:
gaze was used to protect the privacy of users (e.g., display-
ing content that is being looked at while hiding the rest from
shoulder surfers); 3) Improving security based on gaze behav-
ior: by analyzing the gaze behavior, systems can uncover user
properties (e.g., nervousness when reading a phishing email,
or carelessness when creating a password), and intervene ac-
cordingly to improve security.
We returned to the papers and summarized them to identify
their motivations, methodologies, and contributions to gaze-
based security and privacy research.
AUTHENTICATION
Gaze has many advantages in the context of authentication.
Namely, eye movements can be subtle and hard to notice, mak-
ing gaze attractive for observation-resilient and high-entropy
authentication. These reasons encouraged researchers to in-
vestigate ways to leverage gaze for explicit and implicit au-
thentication. We summarize three lines of work: 1) explicit
gaze-based authentication, 2) implicit gaze-based authentica-
tion, and 3) gaze-supported multi-factor authentication.
EXPLICIT GAZE-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Explicit gaze-based authentication refers to the use of eye
movements to explicitly verify identity. In this type of authen-
tication, the user has to first define a password that involves
consciously performing certain eye movements (step 1: pass-
word creation). The user then authenticates by recalling these
eye movements and providing them as input (step 2: password
recall). The system detects the eye movements and compares
them to the password defined in step 1 to verify users’ identity.
Researchers have explored a wide variety of eye movements
that could be used for authentication. This includes fixa-
tions [93], gestures [33, 34], and smooth pursuit eye move-
ments [8,27,35,164]. There are two dimensions to consider in
the use of gaze for explicit authentication: a) password type:
legacy vs gaze-based password symbols, and b) used modali-
ties: unimodal vs multimodal gaze-based authentication.
Legacy vs Gaze-based Password Symbols
The first dimension refers to the type of password. Passwords
in gaze-based explicit authentication can have two forms: 1)
gaze can be used as a modality for entering legacy passwords
(e.g., PINs, text passwords or graphical password), or 2) gaze
can be used to enter a gaze-based password where the pass-
word’s symbols are made of eye movements (e.g., a password
that involves gazing to the left, then gazing to the right).
Legacy Passwords
Each password consists of a series of symbols. Traditional sys-
tems have used PINs and passwords (i.e., a series of digits and
alphanumeric characters, respectively). Digits and alphanu-
meric characters are examples of legacy symbols that were
argued to have been superseded, but it is difficult to replace
them because of their wide use as they are easy to implement
and easy to reset. Examples of systems that use legacy pass-
word symbols include banks and online websites. Gaze can
support entering legacy symbols by providing a certain map-
ping between gaze behaviors and certain symbols. There are
many examples of schemes employing gaze to enter legacy
passwords. For example, Kumar et al. [93] proposed one of
the first gaze-based authentication schemes where users fix-
ated characters on an on-screen keyboard and then pressed the
space button to select them. The same scheme was used on
ATMs by Seetharama et al. [142]. Similar work was also done
by Kasprowski et al. [63] who used gaze for pointing at PINs
and confirmed selection by pressing a key. EyePassShapes
uses eye movements to enter alphanumeric passwords [32].
Another body of work focused on using gaze to enter PINs.
EyeDent [168] allows users to authenticate on desktops by
entering 4-digit PINs using eye gaze. Users do not dwell or
press triggers. Instead, the system automatically clusters the
gaze points to estimate which targets the user intended to select.
PathWord [8] is another system where users enter 4-digit PINs
by performing smooth pursuit eye movements that follow the
trajectory of the respective digits. GazeTouchPIN [79] allows
users to enter 4-digit PINs on mobile devices using touch and
gaze input. Liu et al. [102] explored using gaze gestures to
enter 4-digit PINs on smartphones. Best and Duchowski [15]
proposed using gaze to enter PINs on a rotary dial interface.
Several works used smooth pursuit eye movements to allow
users to enter 4-digit PINs on a public display [27, 80, 83].
Other researchers explored the augmentation of graphical pass-
word schemes by using gaze input. For example, in the work of
Forget et al. [43,44], Bulling et al. [20] and others [10,86,157],
users fixated points on a shown image, using their gaze as an
alternative to clicking with the mouse. Similarly, George et
al. [49] used gaze to input 3D graphical passwords in VR.
Another authentication scheme that has been extended using
gaze input is PassFaces [129]; several works [37, 53] extended
PassFaces to allow gaze-based selection based on fixations.
In EyeSec [98], the authors propose using gaze for input on
multiple existing systems, including PIN pads and Patterns.
The advantage of using gaze to enter legacy password sym-
bols is that they can easily integrate with existing backends.
For example, to employ EyePIN [33] at an ATM that accepts
4-digit PINs, all that is needed is a camera to track the user’s
eyes. However, the disadvantage is that the schemes might in-
duce additional cognitive load on the user in order for them to
understand the mapping between their gaze and the resulting
symbol. Furthermore, most of these schemes are significantly
slower to use compared to traditional, less secure alternatives.
For example, GazeTouchPIN [79] and EyePassword [93] re-
quire 10.8 and 9.2 seconds respectively to authenticate, while
classical PINs require 1-1.5 seconds only [167].
Gaze-based Passwords
Gaze-based passwords are based on gaze behavior. These
schemes transform the password space and, hence, are likely
to have a different impact on memorability. Examples include
GazeTouchPass [74] and GTmoPass [78], where gaze gestures
constitute part of the password. Similarly, in EyePass [34] and
another work by De Luca et al. [33], the password consists
of a series of gaze gestures. In DyGazePass [126, 127], the
user’s input is a series of smooth pursuit movements that
are supported by cues in the form of 2D geometric objects.
In EGBP [141], users authenticate by gazing in one of four
directions and then performing a blink to confirm input.
The advantage of gaze-based passwords is that they expand the
password space by incorporating new sets of password sym-
bols. Unlike legacy passwords where PINs, alphanumeric, and
other widely used passwords are entered by gaze, gaze-based
passwords might have a steeper learning curve as users are not
accustomed to them, and require in-depth analysis of mem-
orability as users would be required to learn and memorize
unfamiliar password symbols which could be less intuitive.
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1 Selecting and Recalling Gaze-based Passwords
Authentication schemes that leverage touch, mid-air
gestures, or tactile input make use of the user’s mus-
cle memory [144]. At the same time, the eyes are
perceptual rather than control organs. There is no
evidence so far that eye movements tap into muscle
memory. This raises questions about the memora-
bility of gaze-based authentication. For example, is
it harder to recall legacy passwords when entered
using gaze as opposed to other modalities? Does
the process of recalling a password rely more on
the input behaviour (e.g., finger movements vs eye
movements during password input), or does it rely
on the memorized password itself (e.g., 1234 vs
gaze up, gaze down, gaze left). There has not yet
been a direct comparison between memorability of
legacy and gaze-based passwords. Also, it is unclear
how users select gaze-based passwords and if their
selections and perceptions of strong gaze-based pass-
words match reality. Prior work showed that users’
perceptions of strong text passwords do not always
match reality [161], but this has not yet been investi-
gated for gaze. These gaps have not been addressed
and are open directions for future research. Under-
standing this will allow the community to identify
whether gaze-based passwords offer additional ben-
efits, or if it is rather more practical to use gaze to
input legacy passwords.
Unimodal vs Multimodal Gaze-based Authentication
Gaze has been used as the sole input method when authenticat-
ing. We refer to that type as unimodal gaze-based authentica-
tion. On the other hand, multimodal gaze-based authentication
is when gaze is combined with other modalities.
Unimodal Gaze-based Authentication
The advantage of unimodal gaze-based schemes is that they
are handsfree. This makes them particularly useful for inter-
faces that are physically unreachable (e.g., displays behind
glass windows [31]), for users with motor disabilities, and for
touchless hygienic interactions. The disadvantage, however,
is that unimodal gaze-based interfaces need a mechanism to
distinguish input and perception. That is, the system needs
to detect whether a user is gazing at a target to select it, or
merely to perceive it. This has been traditionally addressed by
introducing a dwell duration, i.e., the user has to gaze at the
target continuously for a brief predefined period of time in or-
der to select it [60]. This method has been adopted by several
unimodal authentication schemes [20, 33, 44]. An alternative
is to detect certain gaze behaviors that would indicate input,
such as gaze gestures [36] as done in EyePassShapes [32], or
smooth pursuit eye movements [27, 83, 126, 127, 164].
Multimodal Gaze-based Authentication
In multimodal schemes, gaze is used a) as a pointing mecha-
nism while another modality is used for selection (we refer to
this as gaze-supported multimodal authentication); or b) along-
side a second modality to improve resistance to observation
attacks by splitting the observer’s attention. The advantage of
the former type is that, opposed to unimodal gaze input, the
system can clearly distinguish input from perception as the
user would use the second modality to confirm the intention
to select the target being gazed at. Examples include Eye-
Password [93], GazeTouchPIN [79] and others [63], where
users select each password symbol in two steps. Each step
involves one of the modalities. In the latter type, gaze and
other modalities are used together for improved protection
against observation attacks. For example, users of GazeTouch-
Pass [74], GazeGestureAuth [3] and GTmoPass [78] enter a
series of gaze input alongside either touch input [74, 78] or
mid-air gesture [3]. This requires shoulder surfers to observe
two elements which in turn reduces attack success rates. The
general disadvantage of multimodal authentication is that it
usually complicates password entry. This could influence the
memorability of the password symbols.
How to Evaluate Explicit Gaze-based Authentication
Users will, in general, not adopt a secure mechanism that is
complicated to use and will find workarounds that reduce se-
curity (e.g., write down passwords). Therefore, it is important
to make sure new schemes are both usable and secure.
Usability and Memorability Evaluation
Usability studies often include participants entering passwords
using the new scheme, comparing it to a baseline – usually a
state-of-the-art scheme. The user’s task is to enter a password
provided by the experimenter. The password could be verbally
communicated to the user [79] or read by a text-to-speech
system [83]. Requiring the participant to read passwords from
a piece of paper or a screen [82] is not recommended for gaze-
based authentication schemes as it might impact the tracked
gaze behavior. Error rates are often measured by detecting
input failures. A less used approach, albeit equally important,
is to present users with incorrect inputs and ask them to correct
them [82]. This provides insights on how recognizable errors
are, and how easy, fast, and accurately users can correct them.
Memorability is often evaluated by querying participants after
a period of time to understand whether they remember a) how
to use the scheme, and b) their secret. Note that memorability
is important to consider regardless of whether legacy or gaze-
based password symbols are used. Even if users are entering
the commonly used 4-digit PINs, the input method impacts
the user’s memory [32]. This underlines the importance of
understanding memorability of proposed schemes.
Security Evaluation
Security studies of gaze-based input often focused on side
channel attacks that can be performed by bystanders or co-
located adversaries. Examples of studied attacks include ob-
servation attacks (e.g., shoulder surfing) [39] and video at-
tacks [169]. In security studies that investigate shoulder surf-
ing resistance, the user is often recorded while authenticating
from the best observation angle possible. The recorded videos
are then presented to a different set of participants who have
been trained to attack passwords entered via the respective
authentication scheme. For example, to evaluate GazeTouch-
Pass [74], the experimenters recorded three videos: a) a video
showing the user’s eyes to simulate an attacker observing the
user’s eyes, b) a video showing the user’s screen to simulate
shoulder surfing the touch input, and finally c) a video from
an angle that allows observing both the gaze and touch input.
Guessing attacks, which help understanding how likely an
attacker will find a password by random or smart guesses, are
also important to investigate. However, the lack of knowledge
on how users select their gaze-based passwords (Research
Direction 1) means that there are no established strategies that
attackers use to make informed guesses.
Evaluation Metrics
Regarding the evaluation metrics, usability often entails ef-
ficiency (i.e., entry time) and efficacy (i.e., error rate due to
system malfunction or user errors). Other aspects that can be
considered include error tolerance (i.e., how likely is it that
users perform errors), learnability (i.e., how easy/fast users
can learn how to use the scheme), and user preference. In
memorability studies, the metrics are often the recall rate and
the recall accuracy. The latter is a measure of similarity of how
close the user’s recalled password is to the actual password.
Metrics that are commonly used in security studies are: a)
attack success rate and b) attack accuracy. The former refers
to whether or not attacks were successful while the latter mea-
sures how similar the attacker’s guess is to the actual password.
These values are measured under a threat model that simulates
an attack scenario. Suitable threat models should be employed
when evaluating the security of authentication schemes. For
example, previous work evaluated multimodal authentication
schemes against two observers [76] and by using video record-
ings from two cameras [74]. Commonly studied threats include
shoulder surfing attacks [39], video attacks [32], thermal at-
tacks [1], and smudge attacks [11]. While gaze input is not
vulnerable to thermal or smudge attacks, multimodal authenti-
cation schemes involving touch or tangible input might leak
heat or smudge traces that make the scheme vulnerable to
said attacks. Studying the aforementioned threat models is
important because new input methods do not impact backend
security, but rather impact the possible side channel attacks.
Further metrics that could be used to evaluate security include
the number of guesses required until an attack is successful.
Finally, the theoretical password space should also be com-
puted for any new authentication scheme, while the practical
password space can be computed through a longitudinal in the
wild study to understand what kind of passwords users create.
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2 Evaluating Explicit Authentication in the Wild
There are several evaluation paradigms in HCI re-
search, each suitable for answering certain types of
research questions. Lab studies are generally suited
for quantitative measurements and collecting data
in a controlled setting where external factors are re-
duced or ideally eliminated. However, lab studies
suffer from low ecological validity as they do not
reflect real life conditions. This is why the HCI com-
munity also embraces field studies where systems
are evaluated in real scenarios such as in public.
Explicit gaze-based authentication was mainly in-
vestigated in the lab. As eye tracking technologies
become cheaper [68], and soon to become ubiqui-
tous on handheld mobile devices [73, 75], an emerg-
ing research opportunity is to evaluate authentica-
tion schemes in the wild. This would allow studying
learnability to investigate if users’ performance im-
prove after continued daily usage, as well as social
implications when using the schemes in public, such
as social embarrassment, or unintentionally looking
at bystanders when performing gaze input.
There is a lack of – and hence an opportunity for –
field studies of explicit gaze-based authentication.
This will allow a) collecting ecologically valid find-
ings, not impacted by eye fatigue caused by multiple
entries during studies, b) studying the impact of
learning effects, c) studying long term memorability,
and d) studying use in different contexts.
IMPLICIT GAZE-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Implicit Gaze-based Authentication refers to the use of eye
movements to implicitly verify identity; it does not require
the user to remember a secret, but it is based on inherent
unconscious gaze behavior and can occur actively throughout
a session. It consists of two steps: the enrolment phase during
which a digital representation of eye movements is acquired
and stored as a template and the recognition phase during
which the eye movement is tracked, processed and compared
to the template to establish the identity of the individual.
Ideally, the tracked eye movements should possess the charac-
teristics of an ideal biometric: universality, uniqueness, perma-
nence and collectability. Research in the field mainly focused
on assessing unique eye movements when performing activi-
ties with varying visual stimuli and type (e.g., time-dependent).
Collectability mainly depends on the context of use (e.g., de-
vice capabilities, eye tracking metrics). The permanence of
the eye movements has not been fully explored in this context.
Context of Use and Design Perspectives
Identification vs Verification
In implicit authentication it is important to distinguish ver-
ification (verifying user’s identity through a 1:1 compari-
son) from identification (i.e., discovering the user’s iden-
tity through a 1:N search) as it affects the authentication
performance [149]. In identification scenarios, the more
users the system has, the more realistic and more diffi-
cult the problem is, and thus, the performance of the sys-
tem heavily depends on the sample size, the classification
models, the device capabilities, and the required resources.
Several surveyed works (52) focus on identification (e.g.,
[13, 21, 26, 30, 55, 65, 114, 115, 132, 139, 163]) while relatively
less (21) focus on verification (e.g., [4, 22, 56, 61, 149, 173]),
which requires significantly less processing effort.
Eye Tracking Metrics
In contrast to explicit gaze-based authentication, eye-tracking
metrics for implicit authentication schemes are more diverse,
such as gaze entropy [16], fixation density map [97], angu-
lar saccade velocity [104], and scan-paths [55]. Researchers,
after acquiring gaze data, extend their data sets considering
metrics that build upon the fundamental acquired data (e.g., fix-
ation duration, angles velocity) and calculations on them (e.g.,
mean, maximum, minimum values). The more eye tracking
metrics are available for building identification and verification
models, the higher the likelihood for improved performance.
Several toolkits (e.g., EMDAT, EALab), can be used to process
eye-tracking data and generate larger, more inclusive data sets.
The eye-tracking metrics are often complemented with physi-
ological eye metrics [4, 14, 30, 90, 150] or technology-based
metrics, such as key-stroke sequences [147] and mouse dynam-
ics [65, 136] aiming to improve the performance of implicit
gaze-based authentication. However, the integration with met-
rics from multiple and diverse sources introduces a higher
level of interdependence and complexity, which could be a
barrier when attempting to adopt such implicit authentication
schemes in real-life scenarios and everyday tasks.
Device Capabilities
The extracted eye-tracking metrics depend on the eye tracker’s
capabilities, as they are associated with device-dependent spec-
ifications, such as operating distance, frequency, and operating
window. Considering that eye trackers vary from sophisticated
systems to simple embedded cameras, they have varying char-
acteristics that influence the universality, the acceptance, and
the performance of gaze-based implicit authentication. Consid-
ering that people use multiple devices with diverse characteris-
tics, that issue becomes more intense. Very few research teams
have considered the equipment when analysing and discussing
the findings of their studies [38, 87, 165]. For example, Eberz
et al. [38] used a downsampling approach to show that differ-
ent sampling rates affected the quality of eye-tracking metrics.
Similar work was reported by others [57, 62].The trade-off
between equipment features, the effort of developing sophisti-
cated algorithms for implementing authentication mechanisms
depending on sampling data, and processing requirements for
using such a scheme in the wild remain unexplored.
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3 Context & Design of Implicit Authentication
Different contexts of use of implicit gaze authen-
tication have not been explored. Yet, context may
pose different requirements to interface design and
processing. Questions such as how authentication is
triggered, if identification or verification is required,
etc. could guide the design decisions for implicit
gaze-based authentication. Given that identification
requires more resources compared to verification,
understanding which contexts require identification
(e.g., claim an online profile), which require veri-
fication (e.g., unlock mobile phone) and which re-
quire both (e.g., access email from unknown device)
would enable research to focus on realistic scenarios.
Apart from the interface, the authentication factors
need to be designed (e.g., data type, task type, time
to authenticate) and scenarios where implicit authen-
tication is a better fit need to be explored.
Continuous vs Controlled Visual Stimuli
Two types of visual stimuli have been used in implicit gaze-
based authentication: controlled and continuous. For con-
trolled visual stimuli, people interrupt other tasks and focus
their attention on this stimulus, thus being aware that they are
going through an authentication task. Controlled visual stimuli
can be either static or dynamic. Tasks that are based on static
stimuli include text-based tasks [13, 14, 48, 56, 124, 133, 147],
such as reading a passage excerpt, and static image-based
tasks [14, 21, 25, 56, 104, 105, 115, 119, 132, 133, 150], such as
the exploration of a photograph. The complexity of the images
affects the accuracy of the scheme [150, 170]. Tasks that are
based on dynamic stimuli elaborate the goal-oriented visual
search approach of individuals as they typically are asked to
track dynamic stimuli, such as moving target [6, 12, 14, 48, 56,
61,64,67,88,91,106,118,136,139,148–150,165,172,173,175]
or video recordings [23, 85, 133, 134, 143].
In contrast, when users authenticate through continuous stim-
uli, they may not be aware that they are being authenticated,
as the stimuli are embedded to everyday tasks, such as reading
emails and web browsing [38, 163, 172]. While continuous
visual stimuli are of major importance for HCI as they en-
able unobtrusive authentication, they typically present lower
accuracy and it is under-researched field, in comparison to con-
trolled visual stimuli. Research with controlled visual stimuli
has focused on refining authentication (e.g., improve accuracy,
reduce time) to make implicit gaze-based authentication prac-
tical. Understanding the interplay between the diverse factors
that influence the controlled-based authentication (e.g., task
type, eye tracking metrics, minimum time) would help to move
towards feasible and efficient continuous-based authentication.
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In implicit gaze authentication the user authenticates
based on unconscious eye movements when per-
forming a task. So far, most research in the field
is based on controlled stimuli. The users are aware
that they are going through an authentication task
and the same task is used for the enrolment and
the recognition phase. Before attempting to move to
continuous visual stimuli, it is essential to conduct
more research where different stimulus is used for
each phase. This is particularly desirable in an every-
day settings. It is possible that the required accuracy
is achieved by performing multiple tasks. Different
tasks may provide better results for different stim-
uli. A combination of the above could provide the
required accuracy for the authentication process. An-
other approach can be the use of gaze-based features
that are task-independent. Another future research
direction is to investigate which tasks result in the
most useful data for implicit authentication.
Task vs Time as Authentication Factor
Time is important for the acceptance of an authentication
mechanisms [51]. Hence, implicit authentication should be
performed fast. The majority of the surveyed papers is con-
cerned with tasks as a whole (e.g., [14, 18, 22, 65, 119, 132]),
meaning that the authentication process starts after the user
has performed one ore more tasks. Time varies from a few sec-
onds (e.g., less than 10 seconds [26, 67], 30 seconds [65], 40
seconds [132]) to a few minutes (e.g., 5 minutes [14], 25 min-
utes [85]), with tasks that are based on dynamic visual stimuli
being faster. To improve performance, tasks can be repeated
several times in the same session [46, 135, 152, 165, 175], re-
sulting in longer duration. Very few works consider time as
a factor (e.g., time-based analysis [38]). Five seconds seem
to be a significant turning point for achieving good accuracy,
with dynamic stimuli outperforming static ones [148, 150].
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5 Time as Factor in Implicit Authentication
Authentication is a secondary task for users and
needs to be fast and easy. For example, fingerprint
authentication is gaining market share because users
authenticate in a few seconds. In implicit gaze-based
authentication, time is scarcely used as an analy-
sis variable. More systematic research is needed for
minimizing the authentication duration while main-
taining a high performance, either by performing
time series analysis of the authentication or by re-
ducing the duration of the authentication tasks. To
do that, there is need to study how performance is
interrelated with different task types and visual stim-
uli, whether authentication can be achieved in less
time for certain eye-tracking metrics, whether there
is an interrelation between eye-tracking metrics and
types of visual stimuli, and whether a combination
of certain tasks would enable faster authentication.
How to Evaluate Implicit Gaze-based Authentication
Implicit gaze-based authentication has been evaluated towards
performance, security, usability, and resources consumption.
Long-term evaluation studies have also been conducted.
Performance Evaluation
The majority of the works in implicit gaze-based authentica-
tion focus on evaluating the proposed schemes towards per-
formance (i.e., efficiency of the classification mechanisms)
and explore the efficiency of different features against iden-
tification accuracy [26]. Several metrics have been used to-
wards this direction, such as equal error rate – EER (e.g.,
in [55, 56, 85, 148, 150, 172]), receiver operating characteristic
curve – ROC curve (e.g., in [6, 13, 25, 132, 149]), false accep-
tance rate – FAR (e.g., in [55, 88, 89, 97, 132, 172]), and false
rejection rate – FRR (e.g., in [55, 66, 88, 89, 132, 150, 172]).
In the authentication domain, reporting only the accuracy of
identification or verification algorithms could conceal critical
information about the efficiency of the mechanism and raise
serious privacy issues. For example, reporting a 90% accuracy
suggests 90% of the attempted users were correctly matched,
but does not explain whether the remaining 10% were granted
access to the system or not. The used evaluation metrics should
assess both the probability of false acceptance and that of
false rejection. We underline the importance of adopting the
respective ISO/IEC standard for biometric evaluation [59].
When evaluating the performance of identification and ver-
ification mechanisms, the sample size is key to ensure the
reliability of the obtained results. While in literature several
suggestions regarding the sample size of eye tracking studies
have been made [40, 116], there are no specific guidelines
that have been proposed regarding the implicit gaze-based
authentication. The number of participants may vary between
less that fifty [14, 150], a few hundreds [21, 28, 131], or even
thousands [12]. Moreover, several works are based on publicly
available datasets [5,28,64,114,115,132,151,152] to optimize
the identification and verification algorithms. There is to date
no gold standard for the sample size when evaluating implicit
gaze-based authentication schemes.
Security Evaluation
Security evaluation in implicit gaze-based authentication is
most often concerned with impersonation [50,61,118,148,149,
172] and replay attacks [148, 149]. In impersonation attacks,
an adversary tries to fraudulently impersonate a legitimate
user. Sluganovic et al. [148] simulated this type of attack and
showed that increasing the threshold above which a sample
is considered legitimate, decreases the likelihood of falsely
accepting but at the same time increases the likelihood of
falsely rejecting a legitimate user. Success of such attacks is
also related to the stimuli complexity [172] and the type of
the attackers: internal attackers (i.e. attackers known to the
system) and external attackers (i.e. attackers unknown to the
system) [149]. Access to the legitimate user’s calibration data
also affects the success rate of impersonation attacks [118].
In replay attacks, a valid data transmission is maliciously or
fraudulently repeated or delayed. To prevent this type of at-
tacks the visual stimulus shown to the user should never be
reused. For example, every time the user starts a new authen-
tication session using a moving dot stimulus, the dot should
move to different positions and in different order [148, 149].
Usability and Resources Consumption Evaluation
Very few works focus on evaluating the implicit gaze-based
authentication schemes towards usability, such as time effi-
ciency [150] and user experience [150]. Likewise, resources
consumption, such as CPU and memory footprint [150] and
energy consumption [172], has received little research interest.
Long Term Evaluation
While studying the long-term use is critical for authentication,
very few works [6, 92, 118, 150, 173] report such studies. A
degradation of accuracy is observed with time regardless of
the type of visual stimuli used [92, 150]. To maintain high
authentication accuracy, it is necessary to update regularly the
owner template. Despite the fact that there is evidence that eye
movements change with time [87], the aging factor in not well
researched and understood.
R
E
S
E
A
R
C
H
D
IR
E
C
TI
O
N
6 Evaluating Gaze-based Implicit Authentication
Schemes
Evaluation in implicit gaze-based authentication fo-
cus on evaluating the performance of the proposed
scheme. There is a research opportunity in expand-
ing the work on security and usability evaluation.
This will allow to a) better understand the possible
threats of such schemes, b) understand which factors
(e.g., stimulus) introduce security vulnerabilities, c)
identify the factors that relate to usability and d)
study the user acceptance dimension. Implicit gaze-
based authentication schemes has only been studied
in the lab. Most often the user is instructed to use
a chin rest [12, 14, 89, 118, 135] aiming to achieve
good calibration and ensure the performance is not
a result of inaccurate gaze data. It is possible that
a calibration-free gaze cannot provide the required
data accuracy for this type of authentication. There
is a research opportunity in evaluating such schemes
in the wild. This will allow to a) understand how
accuracy is influenced in real-life settings, b) study
impact of aging effects, c) study impact of learning
effects, and d) study different usage contexts.
GAZE-SUPPORTED MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
Multi-factor authentication schemes are those that involve
two or more authentication factors. The three most common
authentication factors are knowledge, possession, and bio-
metric [120]. Eye gaze can be used for supporting either the
knowledge factor, by requiring the user to explicitly move their
eyes to demonstrate “knowledge” of the authentication pattern,
or it can be used for the biometric factor, by processing the
user’s implicit eye movements to verify their identity. The
possession factor refers to authenticating a user by showing
they “have” a token, a key, a card, or similar.
Knowledge + Biometric
To outbalance the accuracy issues associated with the some
implicit authentication schemes, two-factor authentication
schemes were proposed which combine implicit and explicit
mechanisms. In this case, an explicit mechanism is used to
enter something the user knows, e.g., a PIN, using gaze input,
and implicit metrics are collected and analyzed, e.g., angle
kappa, to provide additional proof that the user is who they
claim to be. Such examples are presented by [54, 124, 140].
In those examples, gaze was utilized for both the knowledge
factor and the biometric factor. It is also possible to use gaze
as a biometric factor while another modality is used for the
knowledge factor. One example is to verify the user’s identity
through their gaze behavior while they enter a text password
using a keyboard or a touchscreen.
It is also feasible to use gaze for the knowledge factor (e.g.,
enter a PIN by dwelling at digits on an on-screen keypad)
while using a different modality for the biometric factor. In
that case, the features used in the biometric factor should be
passive ones such as the standing posture, facial features, or
gait. Otherwise, requiring the user to authenticate via gaze
and perform an additional task to collect biometric data could
result in very long authentication times. The only work we are
aware of that uses gaze input for the knowledge factor, and a
non-gaze feature for the biometric factor is SAFE by Boehm
et al. [18] where users gazed at a predefined target (knowledge
factor) while facial recognition took place (biometric factor).
Knowledge + Possession
Combining explicit gaze-based authentication with a posses-
sion factor would also provide an additional layer of security.
For example, in GTmoPass [78], the user authenticates at a
public display by entering a Gaze-Touch password on their
mobile device. Here, the possession factor is the mobile device,
while the knowledge factor is the Gaze-Touch password.
Possession + Biometric
We are not aware of works that combined the possession factor
and biometric gaze-based authentication. One way this could
be done is by requiring the user to provide a physical key in
addition to engaging them to a visual task and tracking their
eye gaze (e.g., while showing a visual stimuli). This would be
more secure than using either alone. For example, this could
be used when accessing a door.
GAZE-BASED PRIVACY PROTECTION
While authentication protects privacy indirectly by limiting
access to confidential content, some approaches aim at directly
protecting private content from attackers. Here, gaze can be
leveraged in two ways: a) Actively protecting the user’s privacy
by, for example, hiding content the user is not looking at, or b)
raising the user’s awareness of shoulder surfers by detecting
the gaze direction of bystanders.
Active Visual Privacy Protection
Eiband et al. [39] showed that while most shoulder surfing
resilience research focused on authentication, the vast majority
of observed content is text, photos and videos. This means that
we need methods to protect the visual privacy of users. Brudy
et al. [19] proposed several methods to protect users of public
displays from shoulder surfing. The gaze direction of the user
and the bystanders were detected using a Kinect device. Pri-
vacy protection was done either by moving or hiding content,
or by blacking out sensitive content such as personal emails.
Ali et al. [7] proposed a slightly similar privacy protection
application for detecting bystanders, but they only detected
the presence of faces.
Similar systems, like EyeSpot [77] and Private Reader [125],
were proposed for privacy protection on mobile devices. In
EyeSpot [77], the content that the user is gazing at is visible to
them, while the rest is masked either by a black filter overlay, a
crystallized mask, or fake content. In the usability analysis of
the different filter types, the authors found that the size of the
visible spot impacts the reading speed significantly, and that
the crystallized filter is more usable compared to the blackout
one and fake text in terms of reading speed. The authors found
no significant impact of the filters on neither the perceived
mental workload nor text comprehension. However, partici-
pants favored the crystallized mask as it allowed them to see
contextual information such as chat bubbles in chatting apps.
Private Reader [125] similarly enhances privacy by rendering
the portion of the text that is gazed at. The authors studied
the impact on text comprehension and workload, and found
that their method reduces comprehension and induces higher
workload on attackers compared to the users.
While the aforementioned systems relied on eye gaze to selec-
tively hide or render certain content, other works leveraged
the inconspicuous nature of eye gaze to allow privacy-aware
interactions. For example, iType [99] allows users to type text
on mobile devices using their gaze. Another example is Eye-
Vote [84], which allows users to anonymously vote on public
displays without revealing their choices to bystanders. Several
systems were proposed for transferring content from public
devices to personal ones using eye gaze because it makes it
more difficult for bystanders to know which content the user
is interested in [110, 158–160].
While these systems were not built with the aim of privacy
protection, privacy-aware interactions were a byproduct of
using gaze input.
Raising Awareness of Shoulder Surfers in Real Time
In addition to active privacy protection, Brudy et al. [19] also
proposed mechanisms for raising the awareness of public dis-
play users about bystanders who might be shoulder surfing
them. They experimented with flashing the borders of the dis-
play when a bystander gazes at the display while it is in use
by someone else, and visualizing the passerby’s gaze direction
and/or body orientation when it is in use.
Zhou et al. [176, 177] proposed multiple interfaces that raise
the user’s awareness of shoulder surfers through visual and
auditory notifications. Similarly, Saad et al. [137] proposed
different methods to communicate the presence of shoulder
surfers to users by using face recognition. Despite not being
based on gaze estimation, these works discuss this as a future
step for improving the accuracy of detection and increasing
the applicability of their concepts.
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Gaze-based privacy protection is a promising appli-
cation area. However, research done in this area so
far is disconnected. Some works investigated how
gaze can be used to inform which on-screen content
to hide from shoulder surfers [19, 77, 125]. In these
works, the presence of shoulder surfers was assumed.
Other works studied best practices to inform the user
of the presence of shoulder surfers [137, 176, 177].
None of those works studied how to detect the pres-
ence of shoulder surfers.
A straight forward idea could be to detect the gaze di-
rection of bystanders to estimate if they are shoulder
surfing the user. However, this solution comes with
several implications. First, from a technical perspec-
tive, wider angle lenses (e.g., fisheye lenses) need to
be used, which, however, distort the edges of photos.
This raises the challenge of detecting eye contact
despite the distortions to the shoulder surfer’s face.
Second, being able to detect the gaze direction of sur-
rounding bystanders brings its own privacy concerns:
Is a user’s device allowed to detect the gaze direction
of bystanders? How can bystanders consent to that?
If consent can be retrieved, would shoulder surfers
consent to processing their gaze behavior knowing
that this might deter their attacks?
Previous work already discussed how the pervasive-
ness of eye tracking raises privacy and ethical con-
cerns [73]. Here, we raise an additional concern
of how protecting the privacy of the user might re-
sult in compromising the privacy of bystanders if
we assume that every bystander is an attacker. Ad-
dressing this would not only improve privacy pro-
tection mechanisms, but can also improve authenti-
cation mechanisms. In particular, some observation
resilient explicit authentication mechanisms are very
effective against shoulder surfing but cannot be used
on daily basis due to, for example, requiring long
entry times [79]. If the system is aware of the pres-
ence of bystanders, it could then require the user to
authenticate using a more secure mechanism. This
would improve the overall user experience as the
user will be using a more usable mechanism.
IMPROVING SECURITY BASED ON GAZE BEHAVIOR
We discussed the use of gaze to support authentication and pri-
vacy protection. In addition, tracking the user’s gaze behavior
can help understand their attitude towards security and detect
insecure behavior. A number of attempts to build mechanisms
for supporting or improving security have been proposed based
on the understanding gained from observing and analyzing
user gaze behavior when performing security tasks.
Prior work used eye tracking to study the effectiveness of se-
curity indicators on web browsers and the ability of users to
detect phishing websites. Here, gaze has not only been used
to understand user behavior [9, 29] but also as a mean to im-
prove behavior to prevent such attacks [113]. For example,
Arianezhad et al. [9] reported correlations between security
expertise and gaze durations at security indicators. While their
results highlight the correlation, Miyamoto et al. [113] devel-
oped mechanisms to build on this knowledge by proposing a
web browser extension preventing users from providing input
in web forms until they gazed at the browser’s address bar.
Steinfeld et al. used eye tracking to explore users’ attitudes
towards privacy policies [155]. They revealed users’ tendency
to read the policy when presented by default, while when given
the option to sign their agreement without reading the policy,
they tend to skip it. Pfeffel et al. [122] used eye tracking to
explore how users decide if an email is phishing email or real.
Rather than for input, some researchers analyzed gaze during
authentication with the aim to nudge users towards adopting
more secure behavior. Mihajlov et al. [112] explored how
much time is spent by users in different registration fields.
Similarly, Katsini et al. [69, 71] and Fidas et al. [42] explored
where users’ attention is drawn and how it is associated with
graphical password choices. They used this knowledge to
design mechanisms that nudge users towards better password
decisions [71, 72]. In graphical authentication, eye tracking
data has been used for building dictionaries of hot-spots [96],
i.e., frequently selected – and thus insecure – positions and for
creating cognition-based user models to provide personalized
adaptations of authentication schemes [70, 128].
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8 Understanding Gaze Behavior in Security Tasks
There is relatively little research in this area. Gaze
behavior reflects cognitive processes, visual atten-
tion, and other user attributes [109] which can be
used to identify vulnerabilities of security systems
and design improved solutions.
Understanding gaze behavior can help improve
security. For example, similar to previous work
[9, 29, 113], eye tracking can be used to detect
whether or not users examined an email’s sender to
deter users from accessing links in phishing emails.
Another approach is to use gaze to detect fear or
sense of urgency [2], which are among the emotions
social engineers try to instill in phishing and vishing
attacks [130]. Analyzing gaze behavior can also help
improve usability and memorability. For example,
the user’s pupillary response can reflect if the cog-
nitive load induced by recalling passwords is too
high, indicating that the scheme’s memorability can
be improved. Similarly, frequent scanpaths might
indicate confusion, which can in turn indicate that
the usability of a system or a task (e.g., installing
security updates) should be improved.
A drawback of continuous gaze monitoring, even if done with
the intention of improving security, is that the tracked gaze
data can have negative privacy implications. For example, the
widespread use of security applications that leverage gaze data
can be a gateway for adversaries to spread malware exploiting
the user’s gaze data for profiling. We discuss this in detail in
“Challenge 2: Privacy Implications of Eye Tracking”.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
In the following, we highlight some of the most pressing issues
that, in our view, should be addressed in the near future of
gaze-based security applications.
Challenge 1: Accuracy and Speed Trade off
Implicit gaze-based security applications require highly ac-
curate gaze estimates to be truly implicit and work without
the user’s intervention. To collect highly accurate gaze data,
calibration is necessary [109]. For a long time, eye trackers re-
quired users to be very still and even required them to use chin
rests [33]. While modern eye trackers afford to allow users to
move around to an extent, they often need to be recalibrated ev-
ery time the user’s or the setup’s state change significantly. But
calibration introduces an overhead to the interaction process,
and it is perceived to be tedious, unnatural and time consum-
ing [164]. There is a lot of research directed at making calibra-
tion more of an implicit rather than an explicit procedure by,
for example, making it part of the interaction process while
reading text or watching videos [81, 123, 156]. Previous work
that studied implicit calibration addressed general use cases
but not implicit authentication. This leaves room for future
work on how to calibrate in a way to optimize the performance
of implicit authentication. This requires first understanding
the trade-off between calibration time and accuracy in implicit
gaze-based authentication.
In contrast, some explicit gaze-based security applications do
not require accurate gaze data. For example, many explicit
schemes employ calibration-free gaze input methods like ges-
tures [32, 79] and Pursuits [27, 83] which can perform accu-
rately even when using inaccurate gaze data. These techniques
require no calibration, as a result of which users can start the
authentication process faster. However, calibration-free gaze
input techniques often require longer entry times compared to
other modalities. For example, in CueAuth [83], users spent
26.35 seconds to authenticate using Pursuits, while touch in-
put required only 3.73 seconds. Achieving a balance between
authentication time and calibration time – in particular, while
considering the authentication context – is an important direc-
tion for future work to maintain fast authentication.
Challenge 2: Privacy Implications of Eye Tracking
The eye tracking technology itself can be a threat to privacy.
For example, a user’s mobile device with eye tracking enabled
could track the eyes of bystanders without their consent. This
raises multiple questions. How can bystanders be made aware
that a particular user’s device can track their eyes? How can
their consent be retrieved? And how can their privacy be pro-
tected if they do not wish their eyes to be tracked? Like many
ubiquitous technologies [95], eye tracking can reveal many
private user attributes [100] such as emotional valence [121],
mind wandering [162], personality traits [58], and women’s
hormonal cycles [94]. Another important challenge is to se-
curely store and process the gaze data without leaking it to
third parties. This becomes more problematic if the tracking
device uploads eye images to the cloud for processing rather
than estimating gaze on the fly.
The privacy implications of pervasive eye tracking were dis-
cussed in recent work [73], and a few solutions to address
this were proposed. For example, PrivacEYE [154] is a sys-
tem which integrates a mechanical shutter into a wearable eye
tracker. The shutter is activated when a bystander’s face is
in the camera’s view. This protects the privacy of bystanders,
and assures them that they are not being tracked. Another line
of work applied differential privacy to gaze data by introduc-
ing noise to gaze data to prevent user identification without
compromising the data’s utility. Steil et al. [153] applied their
differential privacy approach on gaze interfaces in virtual real-
ity, while Liu et al. [101] applied theirs on heat maps. Future
HCI research should 1) investigate the privacy implications of
pervasive eye tracking, and 2) develop mechanisms for pro-
tecting the privacy of not only the users but also everyone in
the tracking range such as bystanders.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we summarize previous work on gaze-based
security applications and classify the utility of gaze into: 1) au-
thentication, 2) privacy protection, and 3) understanding gaze
behavior in security tasks. We identified eight promising re-
search directions based on gaps that we found in the literature.
For example, we see great promise in taking evaluations of
explicit and implicit authentication mechanisms to real world
settings, there are usability and security benefits of blending
authentication with every day tasks, and there is a lack of work
on gaze-based privacy protection and gaze behaviour analysis
during security tasks. Furthermore, we identified two chal-
lenges that are important to address in order to make full use
of gaze in security applications and require further research.
Namely, there seems to be a trade off between the accuracy
and speed of gaze-based security solutions. The trade off is
particularly impacted by the need for calibration. A second
challenge is that pervasive eye tracking itself can be a threat to
privacy of the users of the technology and those around them.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported, in part, by the Royal Society of Ed-
inburgh (Award number 65040), and the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft (DFG), Grants AL 1899/2-1 and 1899/4-1.
REFERENCES
[1] Yomna Abdelrahman, Mohamed Khamis, Stefan
Schneegass, and Florian Alt. 2017. Stay Cool!
Understanding Thermal Attacks on Mobile-based User
Authentication. In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3751–3763.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025461
[2] Yomna Abdelrahman, Anam Ahmad Khan, Joshua
Newn, Eduardo Velloso, Sherine Ashraf Safwat, James
Bailey, Andreas Bulling, Frank Vetere, and Albrecht
Schmidt. 2019. Classifying Attention Types with
Thermal Imaging and Eye Tracking. Proceedings of the
ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous
Technologies 3, 3, Article 69 (Sept. 2019), 27 pages.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3351227
[3] Yasmeen Abdrabou, Mohamed Khamis, Rana Mohamed
Eisa, Sherif Ismail, and Amrl Elmougy. 2019. Just Gaze
and Wave: Exploring the Use of Gaze and Gestures for
Shoulder-Surfing Resilient Authentication. In
Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’19). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article Article 29, 10 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3314111.3319837
[4] Evgeniy R. Abdulin and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2015.
Person Verification via Eye Movement-driven Text
Reading Model. In 2015 IEEE 7th International
Conference on Biometrics Theory, Applications and
Systems (BTAS). IEEE, USA, 1–8. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2015.7358786
[5] Narishige Abe, Shigefumi Yamada, and Takashi
Shinzaki. 2016. A Novel Local Feature for Eye
Movement Authentication. In 2016 International
Conference of the Biometrics Special Interest Group
(BIOSIG). IEEE, USA, 1–5. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BIOSIG.2016.7736903
[6] Karan Ahuja, Rahul Islam, Varun Parashar, Kuntal Dey,
Chris Harrison, and Mayank Goel. 2018. EyeSpyVR:
Interactive Eye Sensing Using Off-the-Shelf,
Smartphone-Based VR Headsets. Proceedings of the
ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous
Technologies 2, 2, Article 57 (July 2018), 10 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3214260
[7] Mohammed Eunus Ali, Anika Anwar, Ishrat Ahmed,
Tanzima Hashem, Lars Kulik, and Egemen Tanin. 2014.
Protecting Mobile Users from Visual Privacy Attacks. In
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing:
Adjunct Publication (UbiComp ’14 Adjunct). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 1–4. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2638788
[8] Hassoumi Almoctar, Pourang Irani, Vsevolod
Peysakhovich, and Christophe Hurter. 2018. Path Word:
A Multimodal Password Entry Method for Ad-hoc
Authentication Based on Digits’ Shape and Smooth
Pursuit Eye Movements. In Proceedings of the 20th
ACM International Conference on Multimodal
Interaction (ICMI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
268–277. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3242969.3243008
[9] Majid Arianezhad, L. Jean Camp, Timothy Kelley, and
Douglas Stebila. 2013a. Comparative Eye Tracking of
Experts and Novices in Web Single Sign-on. In
Proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY ’13).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 105–116. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2435349.2435362
[10] Majid Arianezhad, Douglas Stebila, and Behzad
Mozaffari. 2013b. Usability and Security of Gaze-Based
Graphical Grid Passwords. In Financial Cryptography
and Data Security, Andrew A. Adams, Michael Brenner,
and Matthew Smith (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 17–33. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41320-9_2
[11] Adam J. Aviv, Katherine Gibson, Evan Mossop, Matt
Blaze, and Jonathan M. Smith. 2010. Smudge Attacks
on Smartphone Touch Screens. In Proceedings of the 4th
USENIX Conference on Offensive Technologies (WOOT
’10). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1–7.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1925004.1925009
[12] Gary Bargary, Jenny M. Bosten, Patrick T. Goodbourn,
Adam J. Lawrance-Owen, Ruth E. Hogg, and J.D.
Mollon. 2017. Individual Differences in Human Eye
Movements: An Oculomotor Signature? Vision Research
141 (2017), 157–169. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2017.03.001
[13] Akram Bayat and Marc Pomplun. 2018. Biometric
Identification Through Eye-Movement Patterns. In
Advances in Human Factors in Simulation and
Modeling, Daniel N. Cassenti (Ed.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 583–594. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60591-3_53
[14] Roman Bednarik, Tomi Kinnunen, Andrei Mihaila, and
Pasi Fränti. 2005. Eye-Movements as a Biometric. In
Image Analysis, Heikki Kalviainen, Jussi Parkkinen, and
Arto Kaarna (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 780–789. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11499145_79
[15] Darrell S. Best and Andrew T. Duchowski. 2016. A
Rotary Dial for Gaze-based PIN Entry. In Proceedings
of the Ninth Biennial ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking
Research & Applications (ETRA ’16). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 69–76. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2857491.2857527
[16] Ralf Biedert, Mario Frank, Ivan Martinovic, and Dawn
Song. 2012. Stimuli for Gaze Based Intrusion Detection.
In Future Information Technology, Application, and
Service, James J. (Jong Hyuk) Park, Victor C.M. Leung,
Cho-Li Wang, and Taeshik Shon (Eds.). Springer
Netherlands, Dordrecht, 757–763. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4516-2_80
[17] BMW. 2018. BMW camera keeps an eye on the driver.
https://www.autonews.com/article/20181001/OEM06/
181009966/bmw-camera-keeps-an-eye-on-the-driver.
(2018). accessed 19 December 2019.
[18] Arman Boehm, Dongqu Chen, Mario Frank, Ling
Huang, Cynthia Kuo, Tihomir Lolic, Ivan Martinovic,
and Dawn Song. 2013. SAFE: Secure Authentication
with Face and Eyes. In 2013 International Conference
on Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems (PRISMS).
IEEE, USA, 1–8. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PRISMS.2013.6927175
[19] Frederik Brudy, David Ledo, Saul Greenberg, and
Andreas Butz. 2014. Is Anyone Looking? Mitigating
Shoulder Surfing on Public Displays Through
Awareness and Protection. In Proceedings of The
International Symposium on Pervasive Displays (PerDis
’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 1, 6 pages.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2611009.2611028
[20] Andreas Bulling, Florian Alt, and Albrecht Schmidt.
2012. Increasing the Security of Gaze-based Cued-recall
Graphical Passwords Using Saliency Masks. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’12). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 3011–3020. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2207676.2208712
[21] Virginio Cantoni, Chiara Galdi, Michele Nappi, Marco
Porta, and Daniel Riccio. 2015. GANT: Gaze Analysis
Technique for Human Identification. Pattern
Recognition 48, 4 (2015), 1027–1038. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patcog.2014.02.017
[22] Virginio Cantoni, Tomas Lacovara, Marco Porta, and
Haochen Wang. 2018. A Study on Gaze-Controlled PIN
Input with Biometric Data Analysis. In Proceedings of
the 19th International Conference on Computer Systems
and Technologies (CompSysTech ’18). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 99–103. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3274005.3274029
[23] Dario Cazzato, Marco Leo, Andrea Evangelista, and
Cosimo Distante. 2015. Soft Biometrics by Modeling
Temporal Series of Gaze Cues Extracted in the Wild. In
Advanced Concepts for Intelligent Vision Systems,
Sebastiano Battiato, Jacques Blanc-Talon, Giovanni
Gallo, Wilfried Philips, Dan Popescu, and Paul
Scheunders (Eds.). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 391–402. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25903-1_34
[24] Sushil Chauhan, A.S. Arora, and Amit Kaul. 2010. A
Survey of Emerging Biometric Modalities. Procedia
Computer Science 2 (2010), 213–218. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2010.11.027
[25] Elena N. Cherepovskaya and Andrey V. Lyamin. 2017.
An Evaluation of Biometrie Identification Approach on
Low-frequency Eye Tracking Data. In 2017 IEEE 15th
International Symposium on Applied Machine
Intelligence and Informatics (SAMI). IEEE, USA,
123–128. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SAMI.2017.7880288
[26] Nguyen Viet Cuong, Vu Dinh, and Lam Si Tung Ho.
2012. Mel-frequency Cepstral Coefficients for Eye
Movement Identification. In 2012 IEEE 24th
International Conference on Tools with Artificial
Intelligence. IEEE, USA, 253–260. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICTAI.2012.42
[27] Dietlind Helene Cymek, Antje Christine Venjakob,
Stefan Ruff, Otto Hans-Martin Lutz, Simon Hofmann,
and Matthias Roetting. 2014. Entering PIN Codes by
Smooth Pursuit Eye Movements. Journal of Eye
Movement Research 7, 4, Article 1 (2014), 11 pages.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.16910/jemr.7.4.1
[28] Antitza Dantcheva, Nesli Erdogmus, and Jean-Luc
Dugelay. 2011. On The Reliability of Eye Color as a
Soft Biometric Trait. In 2011 IEEE Workshop on
Applications of Computer Vision (WACV). IEEE, USA,
227–231. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WACV.2011.5711507
[29] Ali Darwish and Emad Bataineh. 2012. Eye Tracking
Analysis of Browser Security Indicators. In 2012
International Conference on Computer Systems and
Industrial Informatics. IEEE, USA, 1–6. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCSII.2012.6454330
[30] Ali Darwish and Michel Pasquier. 2013. Biometric
Identification Using the Dynamic Features of the Eyes.
In 2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on
Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS).
IEEE, USA, 1–6. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2013.6712724
[31] Nigel Davies, Sarah Clinch, and Florian Alt. 2014.
Pervasive Displays: Understanding the Future of Digital
Signage. Synthesis Lectures on Mobile and Pervasive
Computing 8, 1 (Apr. 2014), 1–128. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2200/s00558ed1v01y201312mpc011
[32] Alexander De Luca, Martin Denzel, and Heinrich
Hussmann. 2009. Look into My Eyes!: Can You Guess
My Password?. In Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’09). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, Article 7, 12 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572542
[33] Alexander De Luca, Roman Weiss, and Heiko Drewes.
2007. Evaluation of Eye-gaze Interaction Methods for
Security Enhanced PIN-entry. In Proceedings of the 19th
Australasian Conference on Computer-Human
Interaction: Entertaining User Interfaces (OZCHI ’07).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 199–202. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1324892.1324932
[34] Alexander De Luca, Roman Weiss, Heinrich Hussmann,
and Xueli An. 2008. Eyepass - Eye-stroke
Authentication for Public Terminals. In CHI ’08
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI EA ’08). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
3003–3008. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1358628.1358798
[35] Heiko Drewes, Mohamed Khamis, and Florian Alt.
2019. DialPlates:Enabling Pursuits-based User
Interfaces with Large Target Numbers. In Proceedings of
the 18th International Conference on Mobile and
Ubiquitous Multimedia (MUM ’19). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, Article Article 10, 10 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3365610.3365626
[36] Heiko Drewes and Albrecht Schmidt. 2007. Interacting
with the Computer Using Gaze Gestures. In
Human-Computer Interaction – INTERACT 2007: 11th
IFIP TC 13 International Conference, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, September 10-14, 2007, Proceedings, Part II,
Cécilia Baranauskas, Philippe Palanque, Julio Abascal,
and Simone Diniz Junqueira Barbosa (Eds.). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 475–488. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74800-7_43
[37] Paul Dunphy, Andrew Fitch, and Patrick Olivier. 2008.
Gaze-contingent Passwords at the ATM. In 4th
Conference on Communication by Gaze Interaction
(COGAIN). COGAIN, Prague,Czech Republic, 59–62.
[38] Simon Eberz, Kasper B. Rasmussen, Vincent Lenders,
and Ivan Martinovic. 2016. Looks Like Eve: Exposing
Insider Threats Using Eye Movement Biometrics. ACM
Transactions on Privacy and Security 19, 1, Article 1
(June 2016), 31 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2904018
[39] Malin Eiband, Mohamed Khamis, Emanuel von
Zezschwitz, Heinrich Hussmann, and Florian Alt. 2017.
Understanding Shoulder Surfing in the Wild: Stories
from Users and Observers. In Proceedings of the 35th
Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI ’17). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 4254–4265. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025636
[40] Sukru Eraslan, Yeliz Yesilada, and Simon Harper. 2016.
Eye Tracking Scanpath Analysis on Web Pages: How
Many Users?. In Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial ACM
Symposium on Eye Tracking Research & Applications
(ETRA ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 103–110. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2857491.2857519
[41] Nastaran Maus Esfahani. 2016. A Brief Review of
Human Identification Using Eye Movement. Journal of
Pattern Recognition Research 11, 1 (2016), 15–24. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13176/11.705
[42] Christos Fidas, Marios Belk, George Hadjidemetriou,
and Andreas Pitsillides. 2019. Influences of Mixed
Reality and Human Cognition on Picture Passwords: An
Eye Tracking Study. In Human-Computer Interaction –
INTERACT 2019, David Lamas, Fernando Loizides,
Lennart Nacke, Helen Petrie, Marco Winckler, and
Panayiotis Zaphiris (Eds.). Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 304–313. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29384-0_19
[43] Alain Forget, Sonia Chiasson, and Robert Biddle. 2010a.
Input Precision for Gaze-based Graphical Passwords. In
CHI ’10 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI EA ’10). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 4279–4284. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1753846.1754139
[44] Alain Forget, Sonia Chiasson, and Robert Biddle. 2010b.
Shoulder-surfing Resistance with Eye-gaze Entry in
Cued-recall Graphical Passwords. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI ’10). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
1107–1110. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1753326.1753491
[45] Wolfgang Fuhl, Marc Tonsen, Andreas Bulling, and
Enkelejda Kasneci. 2016. Pupil Detection for
Head-mounted Eye Tracking in the Wild: An Evaluation
of the State of the Art. Machine Vision and Applications
27, 8 (Nov 2016), 1275–1288. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00138-016-0776-4
[46] Chiara Galdi, Michele Nappi, Daniel Riccio, Virginio
Cantoni, and Marco Porta. 2013. A New Gaze Analysis
Based Soft-Biometric. In Pattern Recognition, Jesús
Ariel Carrasco-Ochoa, José Francisco
Martínez-Trinidad, Joaquín Salas Rodríguez, and
Gabriella Sanniti di Baja (Eds.). Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 136–144. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38989-4_14
[47] Chiara Galdi, Michele Nappi, Daniel Riccio, and Harry
Wechsler. 2016. Eye Movement Analysis for Human
Authentication: A Critical Survey. Pattern Recognition
Letters 84 (2016), 272–283. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2016.11.002
[48] Anjith George and Aurobinda Routray. 2016. A Score
Level Fusion method for Eye Movement Biometrics.
Pattern Recognition Letters 82 (2016), 207–215. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2015.11.020
[49] Ceenu George, Mohamed Khamis, Daniel Buschek, and
Heinrich Hussmann. 2019. Investigating the Third
Dimension for Authentication in Immersive Virtual
Reality and in the Real World. In 2019 IEEE Conference
on Virtual Reality and 3D User Interfaces (VR). IEEE,
USA, 277–285. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/VR.2019.8797862
[50] Isaac Griswold-Steiner, Zakery Fyke, Mushfique
Ahmed, and Abdul Serwadda. 2018. Morph-a-Dope:
Using Pupil Manipulation to Spoof Eye Movement
Biometrics. In 2018 9th IEEE Annual Ubiquitous
Computing, Electronics Mobile Communication
Conference (UEMCON). IEEE, USA, 543–552. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/UEMCON.2018.8796625
[51] Marian Harbach, Alexander De Luca, and Serge
Egelman. 2016. The Anatomy of Smartphone
Unlocking: A Field Study of Android Lock Screens. In
Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’16). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 4806–4817. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858267
[52] Teresa Hirzle, Jan Gugenheimer, Florian Geiselhart,
Andreas Bulling, and Enrico Rukzio. 2019. A Design
Space for Gaze Interaction on Head-mounted Displays.
In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’19). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, Article 625, 12 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300855
[53] Bogdan Hoanca and Kenrick Mock. 2006. Secure
Graphical Password System for High Traffic Public
Areas. In Proceedings of the 2006 Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’06). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 35–35. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1117309.1117319
[54] Bogdan Hoanca and Kenrick Mock. 2011. Methods and
Systems for Multiple Factor Authentication using Gaze
Tracking and Iris Scanning. (July 2011).
https://patents.google.com/patent/US7986816B1 US
Patent 7,986,816.
[55] Corey D. Holland and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2011.
Biometric Identification via Eye Movement Scanpaths in
Reading. In 2011 International Joint Conference on
Biometrics (IJCB). IEEE, USA, 1–8. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/IJCB.2011.6117536
[56] Corey D. Holland and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2012.
Biometric Verification via Complex Eye Movements:
The Effects of Environment and Stimulus. In 2012 IEEE
Fifth International Conference on Biometrics: Theory,
Applications and Systems (BTAS). IEEE, USA, 39–46.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2012.6374556
[57] Corey D. Holland and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2013.
Complex Eye Movement Pattern Biometrics: The
Effects of Environment and Stimulus. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 8,
12 (Dec 2013), 2115–2126. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2013.2285884
[58] Sabrina Hoppe, Tobias Loetscher, Stephanie A. Morey,
and Andreas Bulling. 2018. Eye Movements During
Everyday Behavior Predict Personality Traits. Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience 12 (Apr 2018), 1–8. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00105
[59] ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 2006. Information Technology –
Biometric Performance Testing and Reporting – Part 1:
Principles and Framework. Standard. International
Organization for Standardization, Geneva, CH.
[60] Robert J. K. Jacob. 1990. What You Look at is What
You Get: Eye Movement-based Interaction Techniques.
In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’90). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 11–18. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/97243.97246
[61] Martti Juhola, Youming Zhang, and Jyrki Rasku. 2013.
Biometric Verification of a Subject through Eye
Movements. Computers in Biology and Medicine 43, 1
(2013), 42–50. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compbiomed.2012.10.005
[62] Paweł Kasprowski. 2013. The Impact of Temporal
Proximity between Samples on Eye Movement
Biometric Identification. In Computer Information
Systems and Industrial Management, Khalid Saeed,
Rituparna Chaki, Agostino Cortesi, and Sławomir
Wierzchon´ (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 77–87. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40925-7_8
[63] Paweł Kasprowski and Katarzyna Hare˛z˙lak. 2014.
Cheap and Easy PIN Entering Using Eye Gaze. Annales
Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio AI,
Informatica 14, 1 (2014), 75–84.
[64] Paweł Kasprowski and Katarzyna Hare˛z˙lak. 2016. Using
Dissimilarity Matrix for Eye Movement Biometrics with
a Jumping Point Experiment. In Intelligent Decision
Technologies 2016, Ireneusz Czarnowski,
Alfonso Mateos Caballero, Robert J. Howlett, and
Lakhmi C. Jain (Eds.). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 83–93. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39627-9_8
[65] Paweł Kasprowski and Katarzyna Hare˛z˙lak. 2018a.
Biometric Identification Using Gaze and Mouse
Dynamics During Game Playing. In Beyond Databases,
Architectures and Structures. Facing the Challenges of
Data Proliferation and Growing Variety, Stanisław
Kozielski, Dariusz Mrozek, Paweł Kasprowski, Boz˙ena
Małysiak-Mrozek, and Daniel Kostrzewa (Eds.).
Springer International Publishing, Cham, 494–504. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99987-6_38
[66] Paweł Kasprowski and Katarzyna Hare˛z˙lak. 2018b.
Fusion of Eye Movement and Mouse Dynamics for
Reliable Behavioral Biometrics. Pattern Analysis and
Applications 21, 1 (Feb 2018), 91–103. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10044-016-0568-5
[67] Paweł Kasprowski and Józef Ober. 2004. Eye
Movements in Biometrics. In Biometric Authentication,
Davide Maltoni and Anil K. Jain (Eds.). Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 248–258. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25976-3_23
[68] Moritz Kassner, William Patera, and Andreas Bulling.
2014. Pupil: An Open Source Platform for Pervasive
Eye Tracking and Mobile Gaze-based Interaction. In
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing:
Adjunct Publication (UbiComp ’14 Adjunct). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 1151–1160. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2641695
[69] Christina Katsini, Christos Fidas, Marios Belk, George
Samaras, and Nikolaos Avouris. 2019. A
Human-Cognitive Perspective of Users’ Password
Choices in Recognition-Based Graphical Authentication.
International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction
25, 19 (2019), 1800–1812. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2019.1574057
[70] Christina Katsini, Christos Fidas, George E. Raptis,
Marios Belk, George Samaras, and Nikolaos Avouris.
2018a. Eye Gaze-Driven Prediction of Cognitive
Differences during Graphical Password Composition. In
23rd International Conference on Intelligent User
Interfaces (IUI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
147–152. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3172944.3172996
[71] Christina Katsini, Christos Fidas, George E. Raptis,
Marios Belk, George Samaras, and Nikolaos Avouris.
2018b. Influences of Human Cognition and Visual
Behavior on Password Strength During Picture
Password Composition. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 87, 14
pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173661
[72] Christina Katsini, George E. Raptis, Christos Fidas, and
Nikolaos Avouris. 2018c. Towards Gaze-based
Quantification of the Security of Graphical
Authentication Schemes. In Proceedings of the 2018
ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research &
Applications (ETRA ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
Article 17, 5 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3204493.3204589
[73] Mohamed Khamis, Florian Alt, and Andreas Bulling.
2018. The Past, Present, and Future of Gaze-enabled
Handheld Mobile Devices: Survey and Lessons Learned.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and
Services (MobileHCI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
Article Article 38, 17 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3229434.3229452
[74] Mohamed Khamis, Florian Alt, Mariam Hassib,
Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Regina Hasholzner, and
Andreas Bulling. 2016. GazeTouchPass: Multimodal
Authentication Using Gaze and Touch on Mobile
Devices. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI EA ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
2156–2164. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2851581.2892314
[75] Mohamed Khamis, Anita Baier, Niels Henze, Florian
Alt, and Andreas Bulling. 2018. Understanding Face and
Eye Visibility in Front-Facing Cameras of Smartphones
Used in the Wild. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 280, 12
pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173854
[76] Mohamed Khamis, Linda Bandelow, Stina Schick, Dario
Casadevall, Andreas Bulling, and Florian Alt. 2017.
They Are All After You: Investigating the Viability of A
Threat Model That Involves Multiple Shoulder Surfers.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia (MUM ’17). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 31–35. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3152832.3152851
[77] Mohamed Khamis, Malin Eiband, Martin ZÃijrn, and
Heinrich Hussmann. 2018. EyeSpot: Leveraging Gaze to
Protect Private Text Content on Mobile Devices from
Shoulder Surfing. Multimodal Technologies and
Interaction 2, 3, Article 45 (2018), 15 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/mti2030045
[78] Mohamed Khamis, Regina Hasholzner, Andreas Bulling,
and Florian Alt. 2017a. GTmoPass: Two-factor
Authentication on Public Displays Using GazeTouch
passwords and Personal Mobile Devices. In Proceedings
of the 6th International Symposium on Pervasive
Displays (PerDis ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
Article Article 8, 9 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3078810.3078815
[79] Mohamed Khamis, Mariam Hassib, Emanuel von
Zezschwitz, Andreas Bulling, and Florian Alt. 2017b.
GazeTouchPIN: Protecting Sensitive Data on Mobile
Devices using Secure Multimodal Authentication. In
Proceedings of the 19th ACM International Conference
on Multimodal Interaction (ICMI 2017). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 446–450. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3136755.3136809
[80] Mohamed Khamis, Carl Oechsner, Florian Alt, and
Andreas Bulling. 2018. VRPursuits: Interaction in
Virtual Reality using Smooth Pursuit Eye Movements.
In Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on
Advanced Visual Interfaces (AVI ’18). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, Article Article 18, 8 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3206505.3206522
[81] Mohamed Khamis, Ozan Saltuk, Alina Hang, Katharina
Stolz, Andreas Bulling, and Florian Alt. 2016.
TextPursuits: Using Text for Pursuits-based Interaction
and Calibration on Public Displays. In Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM International Joint Conference on
Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp ’16).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 274–285. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2971648.2971679
[82] Mohamed Khamis, Tobias Seitz, Leonhard Mertl, Alice
Nguyen, Mario Schneller, and Zhe Li. 2019.
Passquerade: Improving Error Correction of Text
Passwords on Mobile Devices by Using Graphic Filters
for Password Masking. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 686, 8
pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300916
[83] Mohamed Khamis, Ludwig Trotter, Ville Mäkelä,
Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Jens Le, Andreas Bulling, and
Florian Alt. 2018. CueAuth: Comparing Touch, Mid-Air
Gestures, and Gaze for Cue-based Authentication on
Situated Displays. Proceedings of the ACM on
Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous
Technologies 2, 4, Article 174 (Dec. 2018), 22 pages.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3287052
[84] Mohamed Khamis, Ludwig Trotter, Markus Tessmann,
Christina Dannhart, Andreas Bulling, and Florian Alt.
2016. EyeVote in the Wild: Do Users Bother Correcting
System Errors on Public Displays?. In Proceedings of
the 15th International Conference on Mobile and
Ubiquitous Multimedia (MUM ’16). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 57–62. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3012709.3012743
[85] Tomi Kinnunen, Filip Sedlak, and Roman Bednarik.
2010. Towards Task-independent Person Authentication
Using Eye Movement Signals. In Proceedings of the
2010 Symposium on Eye-Tracking Research &
Applications (ETRA ’10). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
187–190. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1743666.1743712
[86] Tomasz Kocejko and Jerzy Wtorek. 2012. Gaze Pattern
Lock for Elders and Disabled. In Information
Technologies in Biomedicine, Ewa Pie˛tka and Jacek
Kawa (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 589–602. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31196-3_59
[87] Oleg V. Komogortsev, Corey D. Holland, and Alex
Karpov. 2014. Template Aging in Eye Movement-driven
Biometrics. In Biometric and Surveillance Technology
for Human and Activity Identification XI, Vol. 9075.
SPIE, USA, Article 90750A, 9 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2050594
[88] Oleg V. Komogortsev, Sampath Jayarathna, Cecilia R.
Aragon, and Mechehoul Mahmoud. 2010. Biometric
Identification via an Oculomotor Plant Mathematical
Model. In Proceedings of the 2010 Symposium on
Eye-Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’10).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 57–60. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1743666.1743679
[89] Oleg V. Komogortsev, Alexey Karpov, and Corey D.
Holland. 2012a. CUE: Counterfeit-resistant Usable Eye
Movement-based Authentication via Oculomotor Plant
Characteristics and Complex Eye Movement Patterns. In
Sensing Technologies for Global Health, Military
Medicine, Disaster Response, and Environmental
Monitoring II; and Biometric Technology for Human
Identification IX, Vol. 8371. SPIE, USA, Article 83711X,
9 pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.919219
[90] Oleg V. Komogortsev, Alexey Karpov, Corey D.
Holland, and Hugo P. Proença. 2012b. Multimodal
Ocular Biometrics Approach: A Feasibility Study. In
2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on
Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS).
IEEE, USA, 209–216. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2012.6374579
[91] Oleg V. Komogortsev, Alex Karpov, Larry R. Price, and
Cecilia R. Aragon. 2012. Biometric authentication via
oculomotor plant characteristics. In 2012 5th IAPR
International Conference on Biometrics (ICB). IEEE,
USA, 413–420. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICB.2012.6199786
[92] Oleg V. Komogortsev and Ioannis Rigas. 2015. BioEye
2015: Competition on Biometrics via Eye Movements.
In 2015 IEEE 7th International Conference on
Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS).
IEEE, USA, 1–8. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BTAS.2015.7358750
[93] Manu Kumar, Tal Garfinkel, Dan Boneh, and Terry
Winograd. 2007. Reducing Shoulder-surfing by Using
Gaze-based Password Entry. In Proceedings of the 3rd
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS
’07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 13–19. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1280680.1280683
[94] Bruno Laeng and Liv Falkenberg. 2007. Women’s
Pupillary Responses to Sexually Significant Others
During the Hormonal Cycle. Hormones and Behavior
52, 4 (Nov. 2007), 520–530. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2007.07.013
[95] Marc Langheinrich. 2009. Privacy in Ubiquitous
Computing. In Ubiquitous Computing Fundamentals,
John Krumm (Ed.). Chapman & Hall / CRC, NW, USA.
[96] Daniel LeBlanc, Alain Forget, and Robert Biddle. 2010.
Guessing Click-based Graphical Passwords by Eye
Tracking. In 2010 Eighth International Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust. IEEE, USA, 197–204. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PST.2010.5593249
[97] Chunyong Li, Jiguo Xue, Cheng Quan, Jingwei Yue, and
Chenggang Zhang. 2018. Biometric Recognition via
Texture Features of Eye Movement Trajectories in a
Visual Searching Task. PLOS ONE 13, 4 (Apr 2018),
1–24. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194475
[98] Na Li, Qianhong Wu, Jingwen Liu, Wei Hu, Bo Qin, and
Wei Wu. 2017b. EyeSec: A Practical Shoulder-Surfing
Resistant Gaze-Based Authentication System. In
Information Security Practice and Experience, Joseph K.
Liu and Pierangela Samarati (Eds.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 435–453. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_26
[99] Zhenjiang Li, Mo Li, Prasant Mohapatra, Jinsong Han,
and Shuaiyu Chen. 2017a. iType: Using Eye Gaze to
Enhance Typing Privacy. In IEEE INFOCOM 2017 -
IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE,
USA, 1–9. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8057233
[100] Daniel J. Liebling and Sören Preibusch. 2014. Privacy
Considerations for a Pervasive Eye Tracking World. In
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing:
Adjunct Publication (UbiComp ’14 Adjunct). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 1169–1177. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2638728.2641688
[101] Ao Liu, Lirong Xia, Andrew Duchowski, Reynold
Bailey, Kenneth Holmqvist, and Eakta Jain. 2019.
Differential Privacy for Eye-tracking Data. In
Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’19). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article 28, 10 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3314111.3319823
[102] Dachuan Liu, Bo Dong, Xing Gao, and Haining Wang.
2015. Exploiting Eye Tracking for Smartphone
Authentication. In Applied Cryptography and Network
Security, Tal Malkin, Vladimir Kolesnikov,
Allison Bishop Lewko, and Michalis Polychronakis
(Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham,
457–477. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_22
[103] Su Liu, John D. Wilson, and Yin Xia. 2017. Eye
Gazing Passcode Generation Crossing Augmented
Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) Devices. (Nov.
2017). https://patents.google.com/patent/US9824206B1
US Patent 9,824,206.
[104] Andrey V. Lyamin and Elena N. Cherepovskaya. 2015.
Biometric Student Identification Using Low-frequency
Eye Tracker. In 2015 9th International Conference on
Application of Information and Communication
Technologies (AICT). IEEE, Red Hook, NY, USA,
191–195. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICAICT.2015.7338544
[105] Andrey V. Lyamin and Elena N. Cherepovskaya. 2017.
An Approach to Biometric Identification by Using
Low-Frequency Eye Tracker. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security 12, 4 (April 2017),
881–891. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2016.2639342
[106] Zhuo Ma, Xinglong Wang, Ruijie Ma, Zhuzhu Wang,
and Jianfeng Ma. 2018. Integrating Gaze Tracking and
Head-Motion Prediction for Mobile Device
Authentication: A Proof of Concept. Sensors 18, 9 (Aug
2018), 2894. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18092894
[107] Anthony J. Maeder and Clinton B. Fookes. 2003. A
Visual Attention Approach to Personal Identification. In
Eighth Australian and New Zealand Intelligent
Information Systems Conference (ANZIIS 2003). The
Australian Pattern Recognition Society, Brisbane, QLD,
55–60. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/17897
[108] Anthony J. Maeder, Clinton B. Fookes, and Sridha
Sridharan. 2004. Gaze Based User Authentication for
Personal Computer Applications. In Proceedings of
2004 International Symposium on Intelligent
Multimedia, Video and Speech Processing, 2004. IEEE,
USA, 727–730. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISIMP.2004.1434167
[109] Päivi Majaranta and Andreas Bulling. 2014. Eye
Tracking and Eye-Based Human–Computer Interaction.
In Advances in Physiological Computing, Stephen H.
Fairclough and Kiel Gilleade (Eds.). Springer London,
London, 39–65. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-6392-3_3
[110] Ville Mäkelä, Mohamed Khamis, Lukas Mecke, Jobin
James, Markku Turunen, and Florian Alt. 2018. Pocket
Transfers: Interaction Techniques for Transferring
Content from Situated Displays to Mobile Devices.. In
Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’18). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article Paper 135, 13 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173709
[111] Weizhi Meng, Duncan S. Wong, Steven Furnell, and
Jianying Zhou. 2015. Surveying the Development of
Biometric User Authentication on Mobile Phones. IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials 17, 3 (2015),
1268–1293. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2014.2386915
[112] Martin Mihajlov, Marija Trpkova, and Sime
Arsenovski. 2013. Eye Tracking Recognition-based
Graphical Authentication. In 2013 7th International
Conference on Application of Information and
Communication Technologies. IEEE, USA, 1–5. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICAICT.2013.6722632
[113] Daisuke Miyamoto, Takuji Iimura, Gregory Blanc,
Hajime Tazaki, and Youki Kadobayashi. 2014. EyeBit:
Eye-Tracking Approach for Enforcing Phishing
Prevention Habits. In 2014 Third International
Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering
Experience Returns for Security (BADGERS). IEEE,
USA, 56–65. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/BADGERS.2014.14
[114] Mohammad Reza Mahmoudian Motlagh and Patrick
Bours. 2014. User Identification Based on Eye Gaze
Data. In Proceedings of Norwegian Information Security
Conference 2014 (NISK 2014). Trondheim: Akademika,
Trondheim, Norway, 1–9.
[115] Subhadeep Mukhopadhyay and Shinjini Nandi. 2018.
LPiTrack: Eye Movement Pattern Recognition
Algorithm and Application to Biometric Identification.
Machine Learning 107, 2 (Feb 2018), 313–331. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10994-017-5649-1
[116] Jakob Nielsen and Kara Pernice. 2010. Eye Tracking
Web Usability. New Riders, Berkeley, CA, USA.
[117] Ishan Nigam, Mayank Vatsa, and Richa Singh. 2015.
Ocular Biometrics: A Survey of Modalities and Fusion
Approaches. Information Fusion 26 (2015), 1–35. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2015.03.005
[118] Masakatsu Nishigaki and Daisuke Arai. 2008. A User
Authentication based on Human Reflexes using Blind
Spot and Saccade Response. International Journal of
Biometrics 1, 2 (2008), 173–190. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJBM.2008.020143
[119] Nahumi Nugrahaningsih and Marco Porta. 2014. Pupil
Size as a Biometric Trait. In Biometric Authentication,
Virginio Cantoni, Dimo Dimov, and Massimo Tistarelli
(Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham,
222–233. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13386-7_18
[120] Lawrence O’Gorman. 2003. Comparing Passwords,
Tokens, and Biometrics for User Authentication. Proc.
IEEE 91, 12 (Dec 2003), 2021–2040. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2003.819611
[121] Timo Partala, Maria Jokiniemi, and Veikko Surakka.
2000. Pupillary Responses to Emotionally Provocative
Stimuli. In Proceedings of the 2000 Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’00). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 123–129. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/355017.355042
[122] Kevin Pfeffel, Philipp Ulsamer, and Nicholas H.
Müller. 2019. Where the User Does Look When
Reading Phishing Mails – An Eye-Tracking Study. In
Learning and Collaboration Technologies. Designing
Learning Experiences, Panayiotis Zaphiris and Andri
Ioannou (Eds.). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 277–287. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21814-0_21
[123] Ken Pfeuffer, Melodie Vidal, Jayson Turner, Andreas
Bulling, and Hans Gellersen. 2013. Pursuit Calibration:
Making Gaze Calibration Less Tedious and More
Flexible. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM
Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology
(UIST ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 261–270. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2501988.2501998
[124] Carlos-Alberto Quintana-Nevárez, Francisco
López-Orozco, and Rogelio Florencia-Juárez. 2017.
Biometric authentication based on eye movements by
using scan-path comparison algorithms. In Proceedings
of the RCCS-SPIDTEC2 Workshop on International
Regional Consortium for Foundations, Research and
Spread of Emerging Technologies in Computing
Sciences, Vol. 2031. CEUR-WS, Hannover, Germany,
33–38. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2031/p5.pdf
[125] Kirill Ragozin, Yun Suen Pai, Olivier Augereau, Koichi
Kise, Jochen Kerdels, and Kai Kunze. 2019. Private
Reader: Using Eye Tracking to Improve Reading
Privacy in Public Spaces. In Proceedings of the 21st
International Conference on Human-Computer
Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services
(MobileHCI ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article
Article 18, 6 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3338286.3340129
[126] Vijay Rajanna, Adil H. Malla, Rahul A. Bhagat, and
Tracy Hammond. 2018. DyGazePass: A Gaze
Gesture-based Dynamic Authentication System to
Counter Shoulder Surfing and Video Analysis Attacks.
In 2018 IEEE 4th International Conference on Identity,
Security, and Behavior Analysis (ISBA). IEEE, USA,
1–8. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISBA.2018.8311458
[127] Vijay Rajanna, Seth Polsley, Paul Taele, and Tracy
Hammond. 2017. A Gaze Gesture-Based User
Authentication System to Counter Shoulder-Surfing
Attacks. In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI EA ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
1978–1986. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3027063.3053070
[128] George E. Raptis, Christina Katsini, Marios Belk,
Christos Fidas, George Samaras, and Nikolaos Avouris.
2017. Using Eye Gaze Data and Visual Activities to
Infer Human Cognitive Styles: Method and Feasibility
Studies. In Proceedings of the 25th Conference on User
Modeling, Adaptation and Personalization (UMAP ’17).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 164–173. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3079628.3079690
[129] Real User. 2005. Passfaces: Two Factor Authentication
for the Enterprise. Webpage. (2005).
http://www.realuser.com/ Retrieved August 20, 2019.
[130] Karen Renaud and Merrill Warkentin. 2017. Using
Intervention Mapping to Breach the Cyber-defense
Deficit. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual Symposium
on Information Assurance (ASIA’17). 14–22.
[131] Ioannis Rigas, Evgeniy Abdulin, and Oleg V.
Komogortsev. 2016. Towards a Multi-source Fusion
Approach for Eye Movement-driven Recognition.
Information Fusion 32 (2016), 13–25. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2015.08.003 SI:
Information Fusion in Biometrics.
[132] Ioannis Rigas, George Economou, and Spiros
Fotopoulos. 2012. Biometric Identification Based on the
Eye Movements and Graph Matching Techniques.
Pattern Recognition Letters 33, 6 (2012), 786–792. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2012.01.003
[133] Ioannis Rigas and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2014a.
Biometric Recognition via Fixation Density Maps. In
Biometric and Surveillance Technology for Human and
Activity Identification XI, Ioannis A. Kakadiaris, Walter
J. Scheirer, and Christoph Busch (Eds.), Vol. 9075.
International Society for Optics and Photonics, SPIE,
USA, 154–163. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2054227
[134] Ioannis Rigas and Oleg V. Komogortsev. 2014b.
Biometric Recognition via Probabilistic Spatial
Projection of Eye Movement Trajectories in Dynamic
Visual Environments. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 9, 10 (Oct 2014), 1743–1754.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2350960
[135] Ioannis Rigas, Oleg V. Komogortsev, and Reza
Shadmehr. 2016. Biometric Recognition via Eye
Movements: Saccadic Vigor and Acceleration Cues.
ACM Transactions on Applied Perception 13, 2, Article
6 (Jan. 2016), 21 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2842614
[136] Jamison Rose, Yudong Liu, and Ahmed Awad. 2017.
Biometric Authentication Using Mouse and Eye
Movement Data. Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility
6, 1 (2017), 1–16. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13052/jcsm2245-1439.611
[137] Alia Saad, Michael Chukwu, and Stefan Schneegass.
2018. Communicating Shoulder Surfing Attacks to
Users. In Proceedings of the 17th International
Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia
(MUM 2018). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 147–152.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3282894.3282919
[138] Usman Saeed. 2014. A Survey Of Automatic Person
Recognition Using Eye Movements. International
Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial
Intelligence 28, 08 (2014), 1456015:1–1456015:21.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0218001414560151
[139] Usman Saeed. 2016. Eye Movements During Scene
Understanding for Biometric Identification. Pattern
Recognition Letters 82 (2016), 190–195. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2015.06.019 SI:
An Insight on Eye Biometrics.
[140] Daiki Sakai, Michiya Yamamoto, Takashi Nagamatsu,
and Satoshi Fukumori. 2016. Enter Your PIN Code
Securely!: Utilization of Personal Difference of Angle
Kappa. In Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial ACM
Symposium on Eye Tracking Research & Applications
(ETRA ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 317–318. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2857491.2884059
[141] Hananeh Salehifar, Peyman Bayat, and Mojtaba Amiri
Majd. 2019. Eye Gesture Blink Password: A New
Authentication System with High Memorable and
Maximum Password Length. Multimedia Tools and
Applications 78, 12 (Jun 2019), 16861–16885. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11042-018-7043-9
[142] Mythreya Seetharama, Volker Paelke, and Carsten
Röcker. 2015. SafetyPIN: Secure PIN Entry Through
Eye Tracking. In Human Aspects of Information
Security, Privacy, and Trust, Theo Tryfonas and Ioannis
Askoxylakis (Eds.). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 426–435. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20376-8_38
[143] Sherif Seha, Georgios Papangelakis, Dimitrios
Hatzinakos, Ali Shahidi Zandi, and Felix JE Comeau.
2019. Improving Eye Movement Biometrics Using
Remote Registration of Eye Blinking Patterns. In 2019
IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing (ICASSP 2019). IEEE, USA,
2562–2566. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2019.8683757
[144] Reza Shadmehr and Thomas Brashers-Krug. 1997.
Functional Stages in the Formation of Human
Long-term Motor Memory. Journal of Neuroscience 17,
1 (1997), 409–419. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.17-01-00409.1997
[145] Shaimaa Hameed Shaker, Eqbas Ali, and Israa Ahmed
Abdullah. 2018. Security Systems Based On Eye
Movement Tracking Methods. Journal of Al-Qadisiyah
for Computer Science and Mathematics 10, 3 (2018),
70–78.
[146] Meng Shen, Zelin Liao, Liehuang Zhu, Rashid
Mijumbi, Xiaojiang Du, and Jiankun Hu. 2018. IriTrack:
Liveness Detection Using Irises Tracking for Preventing
Face Spoofing Attacks. CoRR abs/1810.03323 (2018).
http://arxiv.org/abs/1810.03323
[147] Daniel L. Silver and Adam J. Biggs. 2006. Keystroke
and Eye-Tracking Biometrics for User Identification. In
Proceedings of International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (ICAI 2006). CSREA Press, USA, 344–348.
[148] Ivo Sluganovic, Marc Roeschlin, Kasper B. Rasmussen,
and Ivan Martinovic. 2016. Using Reflexive Eye
Movements for Fast Challenge-Response Authentication.
In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’16).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1056–1067. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978311
[149] Ivo Sluganovic, Marc Roeschlin, Kasper B.
Rasmussen, and Ivan Martinovic. 2018. Analysis of
Reflexive Eye Movements for Fast Replay-Resistant
Biometric Authentication. ACM Transactions on
Privacy and Security 22, 1, Article 4 (Nov 2018), 30
pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3281745
[150] Chen Song, Aosen Wang, Kui Ren, and Wenyao Xu.
2016. EyeVeri: A Secure and Usable Approach for
Smartphone User Authentication. In IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communication
(INFOCOM’16). IEEE, USA, 1–9. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524367
[151] Anugrah Srivastava. 2017. Biometric Identification
System using Eye Movement Analysis. International
Journal of Engineering Science & Advanced Research 3,
1 (2017), 77–83.
[152] Namrata Srivastava, Utkarsh Agrawal, Soumava
Kumar Roy, and U. S. Tiwary. 2015. Human
identification using Linear Multiclass SVM and Eye
Movement biometrics. In Eighth International
Conference on Contemporary Computing (IC3 2015).
IEEE, USA, 365–369. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/IC3.2015.7346708
[153] Julian Steil, Inken Hagestedt, Michael Xuelin Huang,
and Andreas Bulling. 2019a. Privacy-aware Eye
Tracking Using Differential Privacy. In Proceedings of
the 11th ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research &
Applications (ETRA ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
Article 27, 9 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3314111.3319915
[154] Julian Steil, Marion Koelle, Wilko Heuten, Susanne
Boll, and Andreas Bulling. 2019b. PrivacEye:
Privacy-preserving Head-mounted Eye Tracking Using
Egocentric Scene Image and Eye Movement Features. In
Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (ETRA ’19). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article 26, 10 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3314111.3319913
[155] Nili Steinfeld. 2016. “I Agree to the Terms and
Conditions”: (How) do Users Read Privacy Policies
Online? An Eye-tracking Experiment. Computers in
Human Behavior 55 (2016), 992–1000. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.09.038
[156] Yusuke Sugano, Xucong Zhang, and Andreas Bulling.
2016. AggreGaze: Collective Estimation of Audience
Attention on Public Displays. In Proceedings of the 29th
Annual Symposium on User Interface Software and
Technology (UIST ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
821–831. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2984511.2984536
[157] Abhishek Tiwari and Rajarshi Pal. 2018. Gaze-Based
Graphical Password Using Webcam. In Information
Systems Security, Vinod Ganapathy, Trent Jaeger, and R.
K. Shyamasundar (Eds.). Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 448–461. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05171-6_23
[158] Jayson Turner, Jason Alexander, Andreas Bulling,
Dominik Schmidt, and Hans Gellersen. 2013a. Eye Pull,
Eye Push: Moving Objects between Large Screens and
Personal Devices with Gaze and Touch. In
Human-Computer Interaction – INTERACT 2013, Paula
Kotzé, Gary Marsden, Gitte Lindgaard, Janet Wesson,
and Marco Winckler (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 170–186. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40480-1_11
[159] Jayson Turner, Andreas Bulling, Jason Alexander, and
Hans Gellersen. 2013b. Eye Drop: An Interaction
Concept for Gaze-supported Point-to-point Content
Transfer. In Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia
(MUM ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 37, 4
pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2541831.2541868
[160] Jayson Turner, Andreas Bulling, Jason Alexander, and
Hans Gellersen. 2014. Cross-device Gaze-supported
Point-to-point Content Transfer. In Proceedings of the
Symposium on Eye Tracking Research and Applications
(ETRA ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 19–26. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2578153.2578155
[161] Blase Ur, Jonathan Bees, Sean M. Segreti, Lujo Bauer,
Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2016. Do
Users’ Perceptions of Password Security Match Reality?.
In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’16). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 3748–3760. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858546
[162] Sarah Uzzaman and Steve Joordens. 2011. The Eyes
Know What You Are Thinking: Eye Movements as an
Objective Measure of Mind Wandering. Consciousness
and Cognition 20, 4 (2011), 1882–1886. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.010
[163] Filippo Vella, Ignazio Infantino, and Giuseppe
Scardino. 2017. Person Identification through Entropy
Oriented Mean Shift Clustering of Human Gaze Patterns.
Multimedia Tools and Applications 76, 2 (Jan 2017),
2289–2313. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11042-015-3153-9
[164] Mélodie Vidal, Andreas Bulling, and Hans Gellersen.
2013. Pursuits: Spontaneous Interaction with Displays
Based on Smooth Pursuit Eye Movement and Moving
Targets. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM International
Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous
Computing (UbiComp ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
439–448. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2493432.2493477
[165] Darius Vitonis and Dan Witzner Hansen. 2014. Person
Identification Using Eye Movements and Post Saccadic
Oscillations. In Tenth International Conference on
Signal-Image Technology and Internet-Based Systems.
IEEE, USA, 580–583. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SITIS.2014.116
[166] Volvo. 2019. Volvo Cars to Deploy In-car Cameras and
Intervention Against Intoxication Distraction.
https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-
gb/media/pressreleases/250015/volvo-cars-to-deploy-
in-car-cameras-and-intervention-against-
intoxication-distraction. (2019). accessed 19
December 2019.
[167] Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Alexander De Luca, Bruno
Brunkow, and Heinrich Hussmann. 2015. SwiPIN: Fast
and Secure PIN-Entry on Smartphones. In Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems (CHI ’15). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 1403–1406. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702212
[168] Justin Weaver, Kenrick Mock, and Bogdan Hoanca.
2011. Gaze-based Password Authentication through
Automatic Clustering of Gaze Points. In 2011 IEEE
International Conference on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics. IEEE, USA, 2749–2754. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICSMC.2011.6084072
[169] Guixin Ye, Zhanyong Tang, Dingyi Fang, Xiaojiang
Chen, Willy Wolff, Adam J. Aviv, and Zheng Wang.
2018. A Video-based Attack for Android Pattern Lock.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security 21, 4,
Article 19 (July 2018), 31 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3230740
[170] Hong-Jun Yoon, Tandy R. Carmichael, and Georgia
Tourassi. 2014. Gaze as a Biometric. In Medical Imaging
2014: Image Perception, Observer Performance, and
Technology Assessment, Claudia R. Mello-Thoms and
Matthew A. Kupinski (Eds.), Vol. 9037. International
Society for Optics and Photonics, SPIE, USA, 39–45.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2044303
[171] Yanxia Zhang, Ming Ki Chong, Jörg Müller, Andreas
Bulling, and Hans Gellersen. 2015. Eye Tracking for
Public Displays in the Wild. Personal and Ubiquitous
Computing 19, 5 (2015), 967–981. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00779-015-0866-8
[172] Yongtuo Zhang, Wen Hu, Weitao Xu, Chun Tung
Chou, and Jiankun Hu. 2018. Continuous Authentication
Using Eye Movement Response of Implicit Visual
Stimuli. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile,
Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 1, 4, Article 177
(Jan. 2018), 22 pages. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3161410
[173] Youming Zhang, Jorma Laurikkala, and Martti Juhola.
2014. Biometric Verification of a Subject with Eye
Movements, with Special Reference to Temporal
Variability in Saccades between a Subject’s
Measurements. International Journal of Biometrics 6, 1
(2014), 75. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbm.2014.059643
[174] Yun Zhang and Xuanqin Mou. 2015. Survey on Eye
Movement Based Authentication Systems. In Computer
Vision, Honbin Zha, Xilin Chen, Liang Wang, and
Qiguang Miao (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 144–159. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48558-3_15
[175] Youming Zhang, Jyrki Rasku, and Martti Juhola. 2012.
Biometric Verification of Subjects Using Saccade Eye
Movements. International Journal of Biometrics 4, 4
(Oct. 2012), 317–337. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJBM.2012.049736
[176] Huiyuan Zhou, Vinicius Ferreira, Thamara Alves,
Kirstie Hawkey, and Derek Reilly. 2015. Somebody Is
Peeking!: A Proximity and Privacy Aware Tablet
Interface. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM
Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI EA ’15). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 1971–1976. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702613.2732726
[177] Huiyuan Zhou, Khalid Tearo, Aniruddha Waje, Elham
Alghamdi, Thamara Alves, Vinicius Ferreira, Kirstie
Hawkey, and Derek Reilly. 2016. Enhancing Mobile
Content Privacy with Proxemics Aware Notifications
and Protection. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1362–1373.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858232
